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Individual Liability Under Title VII:
What Did Congress Mean by
"Employer"?
Your assistant accuses you of sexual harassment. She' files a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(E.E.O.C.), naming both you, personally, and the corporation for which
you work as responsible for an alleged violation of federal law. You
are neither an officer nor a director of the corporation.2 Should you
start moving your assets into relatives' names? The short answer is
that it depends upon where in the country your accuser sues you.
If your accuser brings the lawsuit in the Fourth or Sixth Circuits,3
you may be personally liable for any judgment that the court enters in
favor of your accuser. However, if the lawsuit is brought in the Sec-
ond,4 Fifth,5 Seventh, 6 Ninth,7 or Elevenths Circuits,9 the court will
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvIEw.
* Assistant Professor, University of Miami, School of Business Administration.
1. Characterization of the hypothetical accuser as female (and harassers as gener-
ally male) throughout this article is done to reflect the gender combination in the
majority of cases brought, not in disregard of the occurrence of harassment of
men by women.
2. An individual person may be liable in an official capacity. The issue addressed by
this article is whether a typical manager, who has no corporate (or partnership)
equity or voting power, can be held personally liable for his harassment of an
employee.
3. Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia; Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee.
4. Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir. 1995).
5. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
574 (1994). But see Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th
Cir. 1991)(Supervisors who exercise an employer's traditional rights may be lia-
ble under Title VII.).
6. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
7. Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995).
9. The Eighth Circuit has not formally addressed the question of individual liability
under Title VII, but has rejected individual liability in a case interpreting a stat-
ute which is similarly worded. Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377, 380-
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order only your employer to pay. In at least one circuit, whether you
will be personally liable may depend on the district court in which
your accuser files the lawsuit.1o Even though you may not be finan-
cially liable to the plaintiff under federal workplace law,"1 you may
still lose your job or receive other sanctions from your employer.12
This inconsistency among the federal courts on the issue of individ-
ual liability results from a lack of consensus on the correct interpreta-
tion of Title VII,13 which outlaws various varieties of workplace
discrimination, including sexual harassment.14 To date, the United
States Supreme Court has declined to resolve the split in the cir-
cuits.15 The lack of a Supreme Court resolution has inspired many
commentators to critique the reasoning of the various courts that have
grappled with the statutory languageL6 and to engage in an analysis
of the legislative history of Title VII in an attempt to identify the
drafters' intent.1 7 In general, these commentators agree with the
courts that hold that imposing individual liability is consistent with
the goals of Title VII, is desirable to further those goals, and, indeed,
was intended by Congress.18 However, this commentator respectfully
disagrees and expects that the Supreme Court, when it chooses to re-
solve the inconsistency, will concur with the courts which hold that
Title VII should not be construed to impose individual liability on sex-
ual harassers. 9
81 (8th Cir. 1995)(interpreting Missouri Human Rights Act by analogy with Title
VII).
10. The Tenth Circuit has sent mixed messages. Compare Sauers v. Salt Lake City,
1 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 1993)(rejecting individual liability) with Ball v.
Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1995)(individual liability under Title VII ap-
proved in theory, but considered an "open question").
11. Employees may, nonetheless, be liable for such violations of state tort law as in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d
552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651 n.3 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994)(mem.); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100, 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
12. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Max-
well's Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049
(1994)(mem.).
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1989 & Supp. III 1994).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1995).
15. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 115 S. Ct. 574, 574 (1994)(mem.); Miller v. LaRosa, 114 S.
Ct. 1049, 1049 (1994)(mem.).
16. See Christopher Greer, Who me?: A Supervisor's Individual Liability for Discrim-
ination in the Workplace, 62 FoRDELAi L. REv. 1835, 1839-45 (1994); Phillip L.
Lamberson, Personal Liability for Violations of Title VII: Thirty Years of Indeci-
sion, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 419, 422-25 (1994).
17. See Greer, supra note 16, at 1836-38; Lamberson, supra note 16, at 426-28.
18. See generally Greer, supra note 16; Lamberson, supra note 16.
19. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 574 (1994)(mem.); Miller v. Maxwell's Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
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The disagreement among the courts centers on an allegedly ambig-
uous definition of "employer" as used in two critical sections of Title
VII.20 The confusion stems from the following simple phrase: Title
VII imposes liability for illegal discrimination upon "employers" and
defines "employer" to be a "person [which is elsewhere defined as "one
or more individuals, governments.... partnerships,... corporations
. . ."]21 engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of
such a person...."2 2 The controversy over the interpretation is rooted
in the inclusion of the language "and any agent" in the definition of
"employer." Some hold that this language exists merely to incorporate
into Title VII the common law concept of respondeat superior. Others
insist that the phrase adds another class of defendants that is subject
to liability under Title VII.
Support for the respondeat superior construction comes from the
notion that Title VII is entirely a creation of statute. Since Title VII is
not a mere codification of common law, explicit incorporation of the
common law concept of respondeat superior was necessary to make it
clear that a violation occurs when either an institutional employer or
an agent of such an employer discriminates. 23 This reasoning is
sound. Indeed, in the absence of a common law precedent, statutory
silence on discrimination by an agent would have resulted in a shield
for institutional employers from liability for unsupervised actions of
individual managers. That "agent" was included in the definition of
"employer" to ensure against such a shield is a logical construction of
the plain meaning of the term of art "agent" and wholly consistent
with Title VII's goals.24
Nonetheless, a complication for this position does arise because the
term "employer" is also used in the remedy section of Title VII, where
appropriate remedies are listed as "reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice)."25 Proponents of the personal liability
construction read this section to impose liability on both institutional
employers and "agents" who qualify as employers by earlier defini-
tion.26 Simply stated, substitution of the term "agent" for "em-
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-5(g) (1989 & Supp. III 1994).
21. Id. at § 2000e(a).
22. Id. at § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
23. Miller v. Maxwell's Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.). Accord Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 652 (7th Cir.
1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1316 (2d Cir. 1995).
24. The primary goal of Title VII was to instill in corporate America a policy of non-
discrimination in the workplace. 110 CONG. REc. 13,169 (1964). See Williams v.
Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1989 & Supp. III 1994)(emphasis added).
26. See Lamberson, supra note 16, at 428 n.51.
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ployer"-as allowed by the liability section of Title VII to determine if
a compensable violation has occurred-results in a remedy "payable
by the [agent] ... [who is] responsible for the [harassment]."
The confusing use of the defined term "employer" in the remedy
section has caused two federal appeals courts to indicate a willingness
to impose Title VII liability on individuals, although neither court ac-
tually imposed such liability.27 The Sixth Circuit asserted in 1986
that "individuals may be held liable ... as 'agents' of an employer
under Title VII.28 The court made this pronouncement, however, in a
context where no individual supervisor-or any "employer" for that
matter-was actually held liable or ordered to pay anything.2 9 In
Jones v. Continental Corp., the Sixth Circuit addressed an appeal by a
losing plaintiff who had been assessed costs and ordered to pay the
attorney's fees incurred by a wrongly accused employer.SO The court
reversed the award of attorney's fees because it concluded that the
plaintiffs complaint, albeit unfounded, was sufficiently clear as to the
statutory basis for the allegations against the individual (as opposed
to the institutional) defendants since, in its view, the law is clear that
individuals may be held liable under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title
VIL.31
The plaintiff in Jones had brought both Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 employment discrimination claims against her supervisors and
her corporate employer. One ground for awarding attorney's fees to
the vindicated employer was that the plaintiffs complaint failed to
specify under which statute the individual defendants were being
sued, thereby causing unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of
the lawsuit by burdening the employer's counsel with unnecessary re-
search. Since the court construed Title VII to permit liability for
agents, it held that no such undue burden was placed on the em-
ployer's counsel because it was "obvious that Jones' counsel were in-
tentionally and properly seeking recovery against the individuals
under both statutes."32
Similarly, in 1989, the Fourth Circuit in Paroline v. Unisys Corp.
boldly stated that "[ain individual qualifies as an 'employer' under Ti-
tle VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises sig-
nificant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing or conditions of
employment."33 However, the court used this rule only as a justifica-
tion for reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment
27. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Continental
Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1986).
28. Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 1233.
30. Id. at 1231.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989).
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against a sexual harassment plaintiff.3 4 The plaintiff had raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the individual sued,
although not plaintiffs designated immediate supervisor, had exer-
cised sufficient supervisory authority over her to qualify as an em-
ployer under Title VII.35 The reversal of summary judgment did not
result in the actual imposition of any individual liability.3 6
The holdings of Jones and Paroline leave open the issue of whether
a Title VII back pay award against an individual supervisor would
survive Supreme Court scrutiny. Furthermore, it is unclear whether
even these courts would sanction such a result. The courts' language
quoted and discussed above may indicate the potential for imposition
of personal liability. Conversely, the courts' language may only ex-
tend to the alleged harasser's status as an agent of the corporate em-
ployer, such that respondeat superior would apply if he were found to
have harassed the plaintiff. In other words, to paraphrase the
Paroline court, "an individual qualifies as [one who creates a compen-
sable violation when] he ... serves [as a] supervisor"-who actually
does the compensating remains a separate and unresolved issue.3 7
This explanation is bolstered by the fact that other courts have under-
stood an "agent" to be liable only in an "official" capacity.3 8
In light of these incomplete holdings, commentators who charac-
terize individual liability as the majority rule3 9 give a false impression
of the legal landscape. Although a handful of district courts have held
individuals liable under Title VII,4o there is no consensus even within
those districts.41 In addition, and more importantly, an imposition of
personal liability has not yet been upheld by a federal appeals court.
In contrast, when federal appeals courts have been called upon to
assess directly the propriety of imposing Title VII judgments against
individuals, five courts unequivocally have rejected a construction of
Title VII which would allow for such an outcome: in 1995, Williams v.
Banning in the Seventh Circuit,4 2 Tomka v. Seiler Corp. in the Second
Circuit,43 and Cross v. Alabama in the Eleventh Circuit;44 in 1994,
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 113.
37. See id. at 104.
38. See, e.g., Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 & 228 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990); Weiss v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F.2d 407, 410-11 (N.D. Ill. 1991)(a person liable in
her official capacity is liable only as a surrogate for the employer).
39. See Greer, supra note 16, at 1840, 1845; Lamberson, supra note 16, at 422.
40. See, e.g., Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D.N.H.
1993); Hendrix v. Fleming Cos., 650 F. Supp. 301, 302-03 (W.D. Okla. 1986);
Duva v. Bridgeport Textron, 632 F. Supp. 880, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
41. See, e.g., supra note 10.
42. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
43. Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995).
44. Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Grant v. Lone Star Co. in the Fifth Circuit;45 and in 1993, Miller v.
Maxwell's Int'l Inc. in the Ninth Circuit.46 In the latter two cases, the
Supreme Court refused the plaintiffs' request for review.4 7 In Grant,
the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court order directing an individual
to pay the plaintiff back pay for his own harassment of her.48 The
Grant court relied, in significant part, on the Miller court's reason-
ing.4 9 In Miller, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court's refusal to
allow the plaintiff to pursue a Title VII claim against the individual
sexual harassers.5O
The Miller case involved a plaintiff who pursued both sex and age
discrimination claims against six defendants in their individual capac-
ities. The plaintiff accused various restaurant managers of the hostile
environment variety of sexual harassment.51 The district court dis-
missed plaintiffs complaint, inter alia, for failure to state a claim. The
appellate court upheld the district court's ruling, agreeing that indi-
vidual harassers have no personal liability under Title VII.52
In analyzing the issue of personal liability, the Miller court first
reviewed its own precedent, Padway v. Palches,53 in which it held that
individual defendants cannot be held liable for back pay under Title
VII. In Padway, an elementary school principal alleged sex discrimi-
nation in her reassignment and termination.54 She brought suit
45. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994)(mem.).
46. Miller v. Maxwell's Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1049 (1994)(mem.).
47. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994)(mem.); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem).
48. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
574 (1994)(mem.).
49. Id. at 652-53.
50. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)(1995).
52. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
53. 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 966. The plaintiff worked for a public school system, making her supervi-
sorspublic employees. In decidingPadway, the Ninth Circuit relied on a similar
case out of the Fifth Circuit, Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Board, 649 F.2d
1084 (5th Cir. 1981). In Clanton, seven black female school teachers alleged race
and gender discrimination in the school board's maternity policy. Id. at 1086.
The district court held that the board and the individual defendants were both
liable for back pay. Id. However, the court of appeals held that only the board
was liable for back pay because it 'fou]nd no authority for holding public officials
personally liable for back[ ]pay under Title VII." Id. at 1099. The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Miller dealt with private rather than public employees, but the court
did not distinguish its decision from Padway on this ground. Thus, the Miller
Court implicitly extended the Padway decision to private employees when it
283
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against a variety of defendants, including the five members of the
Board of Trustees, in both their individual and official capacities.55
The court eliminated any claim against the Board members in their
individual capacities by summarily concluding that under Title VII
"individual defendants cannot be held liable for back pay."56 The
Miller court relied on its earlier decision in Padway but explained its
reasoning in more detail.
The Miller court agreed with the district court's finding that Con-
gress intended to impose Title VII liability only against an em-
ployer.57 Acknowledging that "some courts have reasoned that
supervisory personnel and other agents of the employer are them-
selves employers for purposes of liability,"5s the court nonetheless con-
cluded that Padway "announced the better rule." The Padway coures
holding was consistent with the district court's reasoning that the pur-
pose of Title VII's agent provision was not to extend liability to indi-
vidual agents, but rather to incorporate respondeat superior liability
into the statute.59 The Miller court noted that "[t]his conclusion is
buttressed by the fact that many of the courts that purportedly have
found individual liability under the statute actually have held individ-
uals liable only in their official capacities and not in their individual
capacities."60
The Fifth Circuit in its 1994 Grant decision explicitly agreed with
the Miller court's reasoning and conclusion when it struck down a
back pay award against an individual.61 In Grant, a female employee
alleged that she was sexually harassed in that she was subjected to a
hostile work environment created by the conduct of male employees
and supervisors. She sued her employer and her supervisors. At trial,
all defendants except one supervisor, Mitchell Murray, were found not
liable.62
stated, "this court's ruling in Padway that individual defendants cannot be held
liable for damages under Title VII is good law." Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991
F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
55. Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 968 (relying on Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099
(5th Cir. 1981)).
57. Miller v. Maxwelrs Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
58. Id.
59. Id. Accord Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,652 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seller
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1316 (2d Cir. 1995); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504
(11th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. See also Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
61. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 574 (1994)(mem.).
62. Id. at 650-51.
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Murray was held liable for sexual harassment "not as an employer,
but personally because he participated directly and engaged in acts in
addition to condoning and encouraging the acts of other workers that
contributed to a hostile working environment."63 The district court
ordered Murray to pay the plaintiff back pay. Murray appealed, con-
tending that back pay awards under Title VII cannot be assessed
against individuals.64 The Grant court agreed with Murray's conten-
tion. It adopted the Miller court's respondeat superior statutory con-
struction6 5 and extended its own Clanton precedent, which held
individuals liable only in an official capacity,6 6 to include private as
well as public employees.6 7
Both the Miller and Grant courts justify the respondeat superior
statutory construction with the fact that Congress limited Title VII
liability to employers with fifteen or more employees. 68 Statutory con-
struction of unclear language requires an assessment of congressional
intent. By following this principle of statutory construction, both
courts persuasively conclude that Congress could not have intended to
impose personal liability because it would be inconceivable for Con-
gress "to protect small entities" 69 and then to allow for the imposition
of liability against individual employees, "the smallest of legal
entities."70
The Miller and Grant courts correctly construe Title VII. A
broader reading of the "employer" who must compensate a harass-
ment victim goes too far. One must construe statutory language and
its limitations objectively, without political bias. The language can
63. Id. at 651.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 652.
66. Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 574 (1994)(mem.). Cf Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a city official's liability for back pay was in her official capacity
only).
68. Miller v. Maxwell's Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. (1994)(mem.). Accord Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d
552, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir.
1995).
69. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
70. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
574 (1994)(mem.). One commentator disputes the notion that Congress' intent
was to spare small employers the expense of Title VII judgments, but his alterna-
tive explanation of the fifteen-employee minimum supports an intention to pre-
clude all small entities, including individuals, from liability. Lamberson, supra
note 16, at 427 (finding a rationale for the fifteen-employee minimum in a sena-
tor's statement that larger businesses generally have a more substantial effect on
commerce and lack the intimacy associated with small businesses).
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only mean what Congress intended it to mean, not what one might
like it to mean.
Those in favor of extending Title VII liability to individuals urge
that punishing the actual perpetrators of discrimination is an effective
tool in eradicating workplace discrimination.71 They assume that
since Congress intended Title VII to create a "national policy of non-
discrimination,"72 it must have intended to impose individual liability
on those who discriminate in the workplace.73 This is an unsubstanti-
ated, albeit tempting, leap of faith.
Congress did not intend Title VII as a legitimization of every mea-
sure that might help to eliminate workplace discrimination. This
greatly overstates Title VII's basic goal. The basic goal was to create
corporate accountability for the egregious workplace discrimination
that existed in 1964.74
In fact, an examination of the congressional debate surrounding
the adoption of Title VII indicates an intent for a commonsense defini-
tion of "employer" and a goal focused entirely on creating a remedy
against businesses. These assertions are supported by the fact that no
detailed debate occurred regarding the statutory language defining
"employer." In addition, the primary concerns that were expressed in
the congressional debate were broad and generally related to whether
the legislation should be enacted at all due to the potential financial
impact on businesses. To the extent that the range of coverage was
discussed, it was to reassure worried senators that the statute's lan-
guage did not extend too far.75
Title VII, as popularly understood, sought to hold corporate
America responsible for both institutional and individual acts of work-
place discrimination. This was all Title VII sought to accomplish, al-
beit it was a sweeping piece of legislation for its time. In fact, as both
the Grant and Miller courts point out, if Congress wanted to impose
personal liability on individual managers, it could easily have done so,
especially since it amended Title VII in 1991 precisely for the purpose
of clarifying its intentions and ensuring that these were met.76 In-
71. See Greer, supra note 16, at 1836-38; Lamberson, supra note 16, at 426-28.
72. See 110 Cong. Rec. 13,169 (1964).
73. See Greer, supra note 16, at 1836-38; Lamberson, supra note 16, at 426-28.
74. Workplace discrimination based on race was so widespread and acceptable that
discrimination based on gender was not meant to be included in the statute. Its
eventual inclusion was the result of a last-minute effort to prevent the bill's
passage.
75. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6831-34,6997 (1964). See also Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d
1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
76. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co.,
21 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994)(mem.);
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.). See also Greer, supra note 16, at 1837.
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deed, "[tihe absence of specific language making a non-employer indi-
vidual liable for these damages, when Congress has included such
language in other contexts [for example, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
1985, 1986], indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individ-
ual liability for back-pay damages under Title VII. ... "77
Moreover, it is unclear whether the imposition of personal liability
would significantly further Title VII's goals. First, the issue of indi-
vidual liability tends to arise only in those few cases where the institu-
tional employer is unable to pay the entire judgment.78 Secondly, in
terms of its deterrent value, the threat of losing one's job or severely
damaging one's career is as effective as the threat of personal liability
for most employees. Indeed, "[an employer that has incurred civil
damages because one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII
with impunity will quickly correct that employee's erroneous belief."79
Finally, a Title VII shield from personal liability is not a license to
sexually harass with impunity because private employees are still
subject to state common law tort and contract claims.80
Fear of inadvertent harassment has already had a chilling effect on
many activities in the workplace. Personalizing Title VII liability
would only make well-meaning individuals even more paranoid and
resentful. In addition, sexual harassers83 who persist in the face of
today's widespread awareness of Title VII are unlikely to be deterred
by additional legal threats. The better focus, as Congress anticipated,
is to encourage institutional employers: to implement training pro-
grams in order to mount sufficient peer pressure to modify the work-
place behavior of Title VII violators;82 to respond to complaints
promptly; and, where investigation corroborates a complaint, to take
swift steps to remedy a sexual harassment situation.83
77. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
574 (1994)(mem.).
78. However, an institutional employer is not strictly liable under Title VII for the
discriminatory acts of its agents, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinton, 477 U.S. 57,
72 (1986), and can avoid liability by swift and appropriate response to a com-
plaint. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c),(d) (1995). See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,
555 (7th Cir. 1995) (an employer is responsible for the acts of its agents and su-
pervisory employees even if those acts are forbidden by the employer, but only
when the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence and failed to
take appropriate remedial action).
79. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1049 (1994)(mem.).
80. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,555 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21
F.3d 649, 651 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994)(mem.);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
81. Throughout this article, sexual harassment has been used as an exemplar of the
various types of discrimination that are illegal under Title VII.
82. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1995)(encouraging preventative measures).
83. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
